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In Bowers v Hardwick,1 the Supreme Court held that the due
process clause does not protect the right to engage in homosexual
sodomy. The Court said that heightened judicial protection under
that clause was reserved to rights "implicit in the concept of or-
dered liberty" or "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradi-
tion."' 2 According to the Court, homosexual sodomy could not qual-
ify for special protection under either test.3
In some circles, Hardwick was thought to spell the end, at
least for the immediate future, to efforts to use constitutional liti-
gation to prevent government from imposing sanctions on the basis
of sexual orientation. In Padula v Webster,4 for example, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit upheld the FBI's policy of considering homosexual conduct a
"significant" and often dispositive factor in employment decisions.
The court said that the issue was controlled by Hardwick:
It would be quite anomolous [sic], on its face, to declare status
defined by conduct that states may constitutionally criminal-
ize as deserving of strict scrutiny under the equal protection
t Karl N. Llewellyn Professor of Jurisprudence, Law School and Department of Politi-
cal Science, The University of Chicago. Bruce Ackerman, Cynthia Chessick, David Currie,
Richard Epstein, Barbara Flagg, Richard Fallon, Larry Kramer, Geoffrey Miller, Judith
Resnik, Geoffrey R. Stone, David Strauss, and Laurence Tribe provided helpful comments
on an earlier draft.
1 478 US 186 (1986).
2 Id at 191-92, quoting Palko v Connecticut, 302 US 319, 325 (1937) and Moore v East
Cleveland, 431 US 494, 503 (1977) (Powell opinion).
3 Id at 192.
1 822 F2d 97, 99 (DC Cir 1987).
1161
1162 The University of Chicago Law Review [55:1161
clause.... If the Court was unwilling to object to state laws
that criminalize the behavior that defines the class, it is
hardly open to a lower court to conclude that state sponsored
discrimination against the class is invidious.'
What the Padula court described as an anomaly became the
holding of United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
Watkins v U.S. Army.6 There the court concluded that the equal
protection component of the Due Process Clause forbids the Army
from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation.7 The court
so held in spite of Hardwick and Padula, and in the face of a vig-
orous dissent from Judge Reinhardt. Judge Reinhardt predicted
that "a wiser and more enlightened Court" would overrule Hard-
wick and, indeed, described that decision in exceedingly harsh
terms: "I believe that the Supreme Court egregiously misinter-
preted the Constitution in Hardwick.... I believe that history will
view Hardwick much as it views Plessy v Ferguson .... 8 In Judge
Reinhardt's view, however, the Hardwick decision compelled the
conclusion that the Army's policy did not offend the Constitution.
In this essay, I make two claims. The first is quite narrow. In
spite of appearances, Hardwick-strictly as a matter of doc-
trine-was interpreted correctly in the majority opinion in Wat-
kins,9 and misread in Padula and Judge Reinhardt's dissenting
5 Id at 103.
' 847 F2d 1329 (9th Cir 1988), reh'g granted, en banc 847 F2d 1362 (1988).
7 Since Watkins involved a federal measure, no question was raised under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court relied instead on the equal
protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, initially recognized in
Bolling v Sharpe, 347 US 497, 499 (1954). See 847 F2d at 1335 n 9. For purposes of the
present discussion, the phrases "equal protection component of the Due Process Clause"
and "Equal Protection Clause" will be used interchangeably. Again for present purposes, it
may be assumed that the basic antidiscrimination principles applicable to the states are also
applicable to the federal government. In some contexts, however, that assumption is highly
questionable. See, for example, Mathews v Diaz, 426 US 67 (1976) (Medicare eligibility stat-
ute distinguishing among aliens does not violate Due Process Clause of Fifth Amendment).
8 847 F2d at 1358.
' Much of the Watkins opinion emphasizes that the relevant Army regulation discrimi-
nates on the basis of homosexual status rather than homosexual acts. See 847 F2d at 1338,
1343. This feature of the opinion serves to distinguish Hardwick in a persuasive way: if the
relevant acts are not at issue in Watkins, Hardwick does not control.
It would, however, be a mistake to conclude that the Equal Protection Clause freely
permits discrimination against a class of gays and lesbians, even if some, many, or even all
of them engage in activity that may be regulated consistently with the Due Process Clause.
The principal thrust of the Watkins decision-emphasizing unjustified hostility, past and
present, against gay men-supports that conclusion. See 847 F2d at 1345-49. Watkins can
be distinguished from Hardwick even if the former decision were to be applied to a class of
people including some, many, or all who engage in the conduct at issue in Hardwick.
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opinion in Watkins. Properly understood, the Hardwick decision
does not resolve the issue in Watkins and Padula.
My second, somewhat broader claim is that the disagreement
over the meaning of Hardwick contains a larger lesson for the rela-
tionship between the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.
That lesson is structural, and operates even in the face of different
views about how hard cases should be resolved under the two
clauses. From its inception, the Due Process Clause has been inter-
preted largely (though not exclusively) to protect traditional prac-
tices against short-run departures. The clause has therefore been
associated with a particular conception of judicial review, one that
sees the courts as safeguards against novel developments brought
about by temporary majorities who are insufficiently sensitive to
the claims of history.10
The Equal Protection Clause, by contrast, has been under-
stood as an attempt to protect disadvantaged groups from discrim-
inatory practices, however deeply engrained and longstanding. The
Due Process Clause often looks backward; it is highly relevant to
the Due Process issue whether an existing or time-honored conven-
tion, described at the appropriate level of generality, is violated by
the practice under attack. By contrast, the Equal Protection
Clause looks forward, serving to invalidate practices that were
widespread at the time of its ratification and that were expected to
endure. The two clauses therefore operate along different tracks.
Because of the independence of the lines of analysis under the
two clauses, the conclusion in Hardwick does not dispose of the
issue in Watkins. This claim suggests that the Equal Protection
Clause is a natural route for constitutional protection against dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation;" and that, more
10 For examples of this conception of judicial review, see Alexander M. Bickel, The
Least Dangerous Branch, ch 3 (Yale, 2d ed 1986); Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in
the United States, 50 Harv L Rev 4, 25 (1936); Lochner v New York, 198 US 45, 76 (1905)
(Holmes dissenting). For a recent example, see James M. Buchanan, Contractarian Political
Economy and Constitutional Interpretation, 78 Am Econ Rev 135, 139 (May 1988) ("The
function of the judiciary is protection of that which is .... The judicial branch properly
serves a stabilizing rather than a reformist... role. The courts should protect what is rather
than try to promote what might be . . ").
" I do not discuss in this essay the complex issues raised by the claim that discrimina-
tion on the basis of sexual orientation is a form of discrimination on the basis of sex. Advo-
cates of that position argue that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is (a) at
least on its face, a form of sex discrimination; (b) part of a system of sex role stereotyping;
and (c) even if in not readily apparent ways, a method of disadvantaging women. See Sylvia
A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wisc L Rev 187. See also
Adrienne Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, in Blood, Bread and
Poetry 23 (Norton, 1986); Note, From This Day Forward: A Feminine Moral Discourse on
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generally, statutes that are unaffected by the Due Process Clause
may be drawn into severe doubt by principles of equal protection.
I. THE REACH OF BOWERS V HARDWICK
A
Perry Watkins enlisted in the Army in 1967, at the age of 19.
The pre-induction medical form asked whether Watkins had ho-
mosexual tendencies; he answered "yes."' 2 The Army found Wat-
kins qualified for admission and inducted him. In 1975, the Army
convened a board of officers to decide whether Watkins should be
terminated because of his homosexual tendencies. Watkins's com-
manding officer testified that he was "the best clerk I have ever
known," that he did "a fantastic job - excellent," and that Wat-
kins's open homosexuality did not affect the company.13 A sergeant
stated that Watkins's sexual orientation was widely known but
that it caused no problems among other soldiers. The board unani-
mously recommended that Watkins be retained "because there is
no evidence suggesting that his behavior has had either a degrad-
ing effect upon unit performance, morale or discipline, or upon his
own job performance."''
In 1977, Watkins was initially denied a position in the Nuclear
Surety Personnel Reliability Program; the ground for denial was
Watkins's statements about his sexual orientation. Watkins's com-
manding officer requested that he be requalified for the position,
stating that Watkins was "one of our most respected and trusted
soldiers, both by his superiors and his subordinates" and that
"[f]rom daily personal contacts I can attest to the outstanding pro-
fessional attitude, integrity, and suitability ... of ... Watkins." 5
The decision to deny Watkins a position in the nuclear program
was reversed.
In 1980, Watkins's security clearance was revoked because of
his sexual orientation. In 1981, the Army issued a regulation man-
dating the discharge of all homosexuals.16 In the same year, an
army board voted to discharge Watkins because of his revelation of
his sexual orientation. Watkins brought suit in federal district
Single Gender Marriage, 97 Yale L J (forthcoming 1988); Loving v Virginia, 388 US 1
(1967) (invalidating miscegenation law).
12 Watkins, 847 F2d at 1330.
13 Id at 1331.
14 Id.
15 Id.
Is Id at 1332.
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court. 17 While the action was pending, the Army rated Watkins's
performance and professionalism, giving him a score of 85 out of 85
possible points. The Army's written statement said that "Watkins
is without exception, one of the finest Personnel Action Center Su-
pervisors I have encountered.... He requires no supervision ....
Watkins' potential is unlimited.'" s
The district court held that Watkins's discharge violated
neither the Constitution nor any relevant statute."" A divided court
of appeals reversed, holding that the discharge violated the Equal
Protection Clause. The court concluded that Bowers v Hardwick
did not resolve the equal protection issue, that discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation should be subject to heightened ju-
dicial scrutiny, and that the Army could not meet its burden of
justification. 0
B
If Hardwick is examined in simple lawyerly terms, the major-
ity in Watkins appears to have understood the reach of the deci-
sion correctly. There was no equal protection issue before the Su-
preme Court in Hardwick. The plaintiffs invoked the Due Process
Clause, complaining that the Georgia prohibition on consensual
sodomy was an impermissible invasion of constitutional privacy.
The Georgia statute did not classify on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion.2 ' Indeed, the Supreme Court said, in explicit terms, that its
conclusion did not deal with principles of equal protection.22 At
first glance, then, the result in Hardwick does not bear on chal-
lenges, brought on equal protection grounds, to discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation.
It is hardly unusual, however, for a decision not directly deal-
ing with an unanswered question to have powerful implications for
that question, or implicitly to resolve it. This view underlies both
the Padula decision and Judge Reinhardt's dissenting opinion in
Watkins. In Padula, the court of appeals suggested that it would
17 Id.
IS Id at 1333-34.
" The district court granted an injunction in 1982. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit re-
versed and remanded to the district court for determination of whether the regulation vio-
lated the Constitution or any statute. 721 F2d 687 (9th Cir 1983). On remand, the district
court held that the regulation was lawful. 551 F Supp 212 (WD W Va 1988).
" Watkins, 847 F2d at 1340, 1349, 1352.
21 See Ga Code Ann § 16-6-2 (1984).
2 478 US at 196 n 8 ("Respondent does not defend the judgment below based on the
Ninth Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause or the Eighth Amendment."). In fact, the
respondent raised an equal protection problem in a footnote, but the Court ignored it. See
Brief for Respondents at 28 n 60.
1988] 1165
The University of Chicago Law Review
be quite strange to hold that the Constitution allows the state to
criminalize certain conduct, but at the same time that it forbids
the state to discriminate against those who engage in that very
conduct.23 In the same vein, Judge Reinhardt argued that "when
conduct that plays a central role in defining a group may be pro-
hibited by the state, it cannot be asserted with any legitimacy that
the group is specially protected by the Constitution. '24
At first glance, there is a powerful logic to this view. After
Bowers v Hardwick, the Constitution does not protect homosexual
acts from criminalization. Since it does not, it may appear peculiar
to suggest that participation in conduct that may constitutionally
be criminalized can help to entitle a group to special constitutional
protection.25
Despite appearances, there is no peculiarity in this suggestion.
In Hardwick, the Court did not answer the question whether a
state may constitutionally criminalize heterosexual sodomy.
Whether the Court had answered that question in the affirmative
or in the negative, its answer would not have prevented a plaintiff
from resorting to the Equal Protection Clause to challenge a stat-
ute discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation or, indeed,
criminalizing homosexual but not heterosexual sodomy.26 It should
make no difference if the question of heterosexual sodomy remains
undecided.
More generally, the Equal Protection Clause is aimed at classi-
fications. The question in Padula and Watkins was whether dis-
crimination against a subgroup of people, some or many of whom
engage in conduct that can constitutionally be criminalized, is a
23 822 F2d at 103. It should be unnecessary to point out, however, that not all gays and
lesbians engage in the conduct at issue in Hardwick.
24 847 F2d at 1357.
25 As we will see, this way of phrasing the issue in Watkins is misleading, not least
because many members of the class penalized by the Army regulation did not engage in the
conduct at issue in Hardwick.
26 See note 84 and accompanying text. As elaborated below, the Hardwick case has no
relevance to a statute challenged on the ground that it discriminates on the basis of sexual
orientation; such a statute would have no necessary connection with homosexual acts. More-
over, it is important to understand that a statute that discriminates between people who
have engaged in homosexual acts, and people who have not, does not in fact discriminate on
the basis of sexual orientation. Some people of heterosexual orientation have engaged in
homosexual acts; some people of homosexual orientation have not engaged in homosexual
acts. For reasons suggested below, a statute discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation
should be subject to special scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause; the same consider-
ations also support the view that statutes should be subject to such scrutiny if they discrimi-
nate on the basis of participation in homosexual acts, though I do not argue that point in
detail here.
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violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Nothing in Bowers v
Hardwick purports to answer that question. The fact that the un-
derlying conduct can be criminalized is irrelevant to the problem;
it is always immaterial to an equal protection challenge that mem-
bers of the victimized group are engaging in conduct that could be
prohibited on a general basis."
The principal flaw in both Padula and Judge Reinhardt's dis-
senting opinion in Watkins is that they read the Constitution as
an undifferentiated unit, rather than as a set of entitlements and
prohibitions that are targeted at quite discrete problems. Each
constitutional provision must be taken on its own. It would hardly
be odd to find that one constitutional provision invalidates prac-
tices about which another provision has nothing to say. The
Fourth Amendment, for example, does not disable the state from
regulating activities that the First Amendment protects, and vice
versa. The fact that the Fourth Amendment does not prevent the
state from regulating all speech-related activities could not plausi-
bly be a reason to immunize speech from special First Amendment
scrutiny.28 Such phenomena can be found throughout constitu-
tional law. As we shall see, results of this sort should be especially
unsurprising for the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.
To clarify the point in the context of Watkins, it is useful to
imagine that there is no privacy principle in the Constitution, or
that the Due Process Clause is purely procedural. 9 Suppose that
in such circumstances a plaintiff brings a suit challenging, under
the Due Process Clause, a statute criminalizing consensual homo-
sexual sodomy. The constitutional challenge would of course fail,
for the Due Process Clause-containing no privacy principle or be-
ing limited to procedure-does not bar the law in question. The
fact that a purely procedural Due Process Clause, or a Clause with-
27 To this extent, the Watkins court is persuasive in suggesting an analogy to discrimi-
nation against (for example) blacks who engage in acts that may constitutionally be prohib-
ited. 847 F2d at 1340. The fact that the underlying conduct may be banned does not mean
that a classification against some people who engage in that conduct is permissible. The
analogy is imperfect, however, because it has already been decided that blacks are entitled
to special judicial protection; the question in Watkins was whether gays and lesbians are
entitled to such protection in the face of Hardwick.
28 See Stanley v Georgia, 394 US 557 (1969).
29 Positions of this sort are defended in, for example, David P. Currie, The Constitu-
tion in the Supreme Court ch 11 at 363-82 (Chicago, 1985); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Princi-
ples and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind L J 1, 8-11 (1971). The view that the
Due Process Clause is without substantive content has of course been repeatedly rejected by
the Court. See for example Roe v Wade, 410 US 113 (1973); Moore v East Cleveland, 431
US 494 (1977).
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out a privacy principle, does not protect homosexual conduct
would have no bearing on the question whether some other clause
forbids the state from singling out gays and lesbians for special
disability. The two questions are entirely unrelated. Or suppose
that a ban on consensual homosexual activity were challenged as
violative of the First Amendment or the Takings Clause. Such a
challenge would in all likelihood 0 fail; but the failure would have
no consequences for an attack brought under the Equal Protection
Clause.
The situation in Watkins was quite similar. The Supreme
Court based its decision in Bowers v Hardwick on the view that
the scope of substantive due process should be defined largely by
reference to tradition. Thus the Court looked to whether homosex-
ual sodomy was "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" or
"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."31 But a
holding that the Due Process Clause extends thus far and no far-
ther does not affect the equal protection claim, which is founded
on a different set of values. As we will see, the Equal Protection
Clause is a self-conscious repudiation of history and tradition as
defining constitutional principles. Analysis of an equal protection
claim therefore proceeds along an entirely distinct track. To say
this is not to provide the affirmative argument for the outcome in
Watkins. It is, however, to suggest that the Hardwick decision sim-
ply does not bear on the problem in that case, and that in this
respect the Watkins majority was correct.
In short, the question after Hardwick is not whether it is illog-
ical to hold that those who engage in acts that can be criminalized
might by virtue of that fact qualify as a suspect class. The question
is instead whether it is anomalous to conclude that a class that
includes people who engage in acts substantively unprotected by
the Due Process Clause can be entitled to judicial protection
against official discrimination. In view of the different functions of
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, an affirmative an-
swer to that question would produce no anomaly.
Indeed, close parallels to this sort of reasoning can be found in
a long line of cases in existing law. The "fundamental rights"
branch of equal protection doctrine is self-consciously designed to
prohibit states from drawing impermissible lines with respect to
rights that the Due Process Clause does not substantively protect.
For example, discrimination with respect to the right to vote and
30 See Roe, 410 US at 152-53.
3' 478 US at 191-92.
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the right to appeal is prohibited even though the states may elimi-
nate both rights.2 Similarly, the Court has barred distinctions af-
fecting the right to marry"3 and the right to procreate3 4 while as-
suming that those rights are substantively unprotected by the Due
Process Clause. The Court's decision in Eisenstadt v Baird 5 was
also in this tradition, invalidating a distinction between the rights
of the married and the unmarried to obtain contraceptives without
holding that there was a substantive right of access to contracep-
tion. In this sense, there is nothing at all unusual in the Watkins
court's conclusion that the Equal Protection Clause forbids classifi-
cations with respect to practices that the Due Process Clause does
not independently protect from state control.36
The principal objection to this line of argument stems from
the way the Court constructed its opinion in Hardwick. In the Su-
preme Court, the plaintiffs challenged the regulation of consensual
sodomy on due process grounds.37 The plaintiffs did not speak only
in terms of sexual orientation. It was the Court that understood
the case as presenting an issue of regulation of homosexual con-
duct rather than of sodomy in general.3 8 The Court upheld the
statute only insofar as it applied to consensual homosexual sod-
omy. The Court reserved the question whether the statute would
be valid if applied to heterosexual sodomy.3 9 In this way, the Court
itself drew a line between homosexual and heterosexual conduct,
upholding regulation of the first but not necessarily the second.
The problem, in short, is this: if Watkins is correct, the very line
drawn by the Supreme Court in Hardwick violates the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. On this view, it is quite odd to suggest that Hard-
wick did not at least implicitly resolve the equal protection
problem.
The first difficulty with this line of argument is that it disre-
gards the fact that Hardwick was self-consciously styled as an in-
terpretation of the Due Process Clause. The Court itself said that
respondent did not defend the judgment below on the basis of the
'2 See Harper v Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 US 663 (1966); Griffin v Illinois, 351 US
12 (1956).
33 See Zablocki v Redhail, 434 US 374 (1978).
1, Skinner v Oklahoma, 316 US 535 (1942).
36 405 US 438 (1972).
'" The difference lies in the fact that Watkins relies on the "suspect class" branch of
equal protection, whereas Eisenstadt and related cases are rooted in the "fundamental
rights" branch. That difference, however, seems immaterial for present purposes.
11 Brief for Respondents 8-9.
38 Hardwick, 478 US at 190.
31 Id at 188 n 2.
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Equal Protection Clause, and that disclaimer would be puzzling in-
deed if the Court's interpretation of the Due Process Clause were
understood to resolve the equal protection issue.
The larger point is that it may be plausible to interpret the
Due Process Clause to permit the regulation of homosexual sod-
omy but to proscribe the regulation of heterosexual sodomy.40 Such
an interpretation would not, however, immunize from attack on
equal protection grounds a law that drew a line between heterosex-
uals on the one hand and gays and lesbians on the other. In its
substantive dimension, the Due Process Clause protects a range of
basic rights; it does not speak to the constitutionality of classifica-
tions. It is in this respect that the Equal Protection Clause oper-
ates as a functional complement to the Due Process Clause, ad-
dressing a different set of questions. For this reason, it would not
be anomalous for the Equal Protection Clause to prohibit the state
from drawing lines that a tradition-based Due Process Clause itself
incorporates. In order to support that view, however, it will be nec-
essary to talk more generally about the relationship between the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.
II. DuE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION
The discussion thus far has suggested that purely as a doctri-
nal matter, the court of appeals was correct in concluding that the
due process ruling in Hardwick had no bearing on the equal pro-
tection issue in Watkins. That claim reveals a more fundamental
point. From its origin, the Due Process Clause has often been in-
terpreted so as to protect traditionally recognized rights from state
and federal power. 41 Nothing in the text of the clause compels such
a conclusion, and on this point as on others the history is ambigu-
40 That question is beyond the scope of the present discussion. It is notable, moreover,
that at the very most, the Hardwick Court distinguished between homosexual and hetero-
sexual acts; it did not draw any line between homosexual and heterosexual people, as did
the Army regulation at issue in Watkins. 847 F2d at 1336-37 n 11. For reasons already
discussed, that line raises distinctive considerations under the Equal Protection Clause.
11 At its inception, however, the Due Process Clause had a kind of equal protection
dimension as well. The clause grew out of requirements in English law that the executive
must comply with "the law of the land." See C.H. McIlwain, Due Process of Law in Magna
Carta, 14 Colum L Rev 27, 44-49 (1914); Edward S. Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of
Law Before the Civil War, 24 Harv L Rev 366, 368-70 (1911). Such requirements imposed a
principle of generality and equal treatment. The Executive was thereby barred from impos-
ing criminal disabilities on whomever he happened to choose. The evenhandedness function
of the Due Process Clause thus has an equal protection component. That component is,
however, distinct from the function of the Equal Protection Clause in providing special pro-
tection for disadvantaged groups.
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ous.42 But in its judicial interpretation, the clause has frequently
been understood as an effort to restrict short-term or shortsighted
deviations from widely held social norms; it has an important
backward looking dimension. For purposes of due process, the
baseline for inquiry has tended to be the common law, Anglo-
American practice, or the status quo. The Due Process Clause is
thus closely associated with the view that the role of the Supreme
Court is to limit dramatic and insufficiently reasoned change, to
protect tradition against passionate majorities, and to bring a more
balanced and disinterested perspective to bear on legislation.
The point should not be overstated. There are a number of
important qualifications. Tradition has not been and should not be
the exclusive focus of the Court's due process jurisprudence. But
this basic understanding has played a large role in the Court's de-
cisions on substantive due process-a point central to the opinion
in Hardwick itself. Indeed, it is on the surface of many of the most
important substantive due process cases. Hence the early incorpo-
ration decisions attempted to defend their outcomes by reference
to notions deeply held in Anglo-American law. In Murray's Lessee
v Hoboken Land and Improvement Co.,43 the Court suggested that
the content of the Due Process Clause would be defined by refer-
ence "to those settled usages and modes of proceeding existing in
the common and statue [sic] law of England .... , In Twining v
New Jersey,45 the Court asked whether the right in question is a
"fundamental principle of liberty and justice which inheres in the
very idea of free government," as to which tradition would be criti-
cal. 46 In the most important of recent incorporation cases, Duncan
v Louisiana,47 the Court examined whether "a procedure is neces-
sary to an Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty," a question
that would be answered by an exploration of "actual systems bear-
ing virtually every characteristic of the common-law system that
has been developing contemporaneously in England and in this
country. '48
Quite outside of the area of incorporation, a number of the
412 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 S Ct Rev 85, 95 (argu-
ing that the Fifth Amendment and the Bill of Rights generally were understood as a
"nondegradation principle" designed to ensure that things would not "get worse.").
43 59 US 272 (1855).
41 Id at 277.
45 211 US 78 (1908).
16 Id at 106.
47 391 US 145 (1968).
18 Id at 149-50 n 14.
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substantive due process cases are rooted in similar instincts. For
example, the Court's principal decisions in the Lochner period
were based on the Due Process Clause.49 In those cases, the Court
viewed deviations from common law standards with considerable
skepticism. Regulation that interfered with the existing allocation
of property rights was treated as impermissibly partisan and as
constitutionally suspect.50 A large part of the reason for this skep-
ticism was that the relevant regulation departed significantly from
common law norms; public law was thus defined by reference to
traditional private law.51 There is, of course, a broad consensus
that the relevant cases were wrongly decided. The central point
here is about structure, not about particular outcomes. The Court's
skepticism about departures from what it perceived as historical
understandings of property rights fits comfortably with a tradition-
based conception of substantive due process.
In cases involving limitations on state court jurisdiction, the
Court has spoken in the same terms. In International Shoe Co. v
Washington,52 the Court said that the question is whether "the
maintenance of the suit" transgresses "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice."53 Similar formulations have been
used in the more recent cases as well. 4
The most controversial and important of the modern substan-
tive due process cases of course involve privacy.5 These cases also
depend importantly on references to tradition. The theme is made
explicit in the majority and concurring opinions in Griswold v Con-
necticut.56 It is also present in Moore v East Cleveland,5 7 where
Justice Powell wrote,
Appropriate limits on substantive due process come. . . from
careful 'respect for the teachings of history [and] solid recog-
nition of the basic values that underlie our society.'. . Our
4' Lochner v New York, 198 US 45 (1905); Adkins v Children's Hospital, 261 US 525
(1923).
50 See Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 8-1 (Foundation, 2d ed
1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 Colum L Rev 873, 874 (1987).
5' See Pennsylvania Coal v Mahon, 260 US 393, 413 (1922).
52 326 US 310 (1945).
53 Id at 316, quoting Milliken v Meyer, 311 US 457, 463 (1940).
" Burger King Corp v Rudzewicz, 471 US 462, 476-78 (1985); World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v Woodson, 444 US 286, 292 (1980).
11 Griswold v Connecticut, 381 US 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v Baird, 405 US 438 (1972);
Carey v Population Services International 431 US 678 (1977); Roe v Wade, 410 US 113
(1973).
56 381 US 479 (1965).
57 431 US 494 (1977).
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decisions establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity
of the family precisely because the institution of the family is
deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition. 8
Despite rhetoric of this sort, the Court's privacy jurisprudence
cannot be understood exclusively in these terms. It is a familiar
point that the use of tradition has produced considerable awk-
wardness in the cases. The principal difficulty lies in determining
the contours and reach of the relevant tradition. Traditions can be
described at varying levels of generality. There may well be, for
example, a tradition of respect for intimate association. The appli-
cation of that tradition has hardly been consistent, however, and
the hard cases arise when the general tradition of respect meets a
particular context in which the general tradition has been repudi-
ated and, to that extent, does not exist at all. There is no estab-
lished tradition of protection of abortion, marital privacy, or use of
contraception. In the hard cases, part of the question is whether
the tradition should be read at a level of generality that draws the
particular practice into question.59 Many of the important privacy
cases read the role of tradition in precisely this way.
In short, the tradition cannot by itself be controlling in close
cases, and the constitutional question must be answered instead by
an inescapably normative inquiry into how the relevant tradition is
best characterized. 60 As a result, the tradition is sometimes treated
as aspirational. The Court has referred in some key cases to
"evolving standards of decency," as to which tradition is relevant
but not dispositive.6' It is for this reason, among others, that the
Court's decision in Hardwick itself is extremely troublesome.62 In-
deed, it is here that the Hardwick Court erred in its treatment of
the privacy problem. At the level of generality that best explains
such decisions as Roe and Griswold, the governing tradition would
58 Id at 503, quoting Griswold, 381 US at 501 (Harlan concurring).
1, For discussion of some of the difficulties in using tradition as a source of constitu-
tional decision, see, for example, John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 60-63 (Harvard,
1980); Tribe, American Constitutional Law at 1311, 1426-29 (cited in note 50). In deciding
the relevant level of generality, norms of equal protection become extremely important. See
Hardwick, 478 US at 214 (Stevens dissenting).
10 See Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire ch 2 (Belknap/Harvard, 1986) (stressing the in-
terpretive character of law).
81 See, for example, Trop v Dulles, 356 US 86, 101 (1958).
2 See, for example, Tribe, American Constitutional Law at 1311, 1426-27 (cited in note
50); Hardwick, 478 US at 204-08 (Blackmun dissenting); Watkins, 847 F2d at 1353-58
(Reinhardt dissenting); Thomas B. Stoddard, Bowers v. Hardwick- Precedent by Personal
Predilection, 54 U Chi L Rev 648 (1987).
11 See sources cited in note 62.
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require far stronger justification than did the Hardwick Court for
criminal bans on sexual activity between consenting adults.
The point here, however, is not to explore the relationships
among tradition, Hardwick, and the rest of the privacy cases. It is
instead to suggest that the Due Process Clause has called for an
inquiry with a significant historical dimension, that the Hardwick
decision turned on precisely this fact, and that a large part of the
function of the clause has been to limit myopic or short-term devi-
ations from social convictions that have been long and widely held.
The Court's function as provider of a "sober second thought"6 by
which to measure legislation is most evident in its use of the Due
Process Clause.
Since its inception, the Equal Protection Clause has served an
entirely different set of purposes from the Due Process Clause. The
Equal Protection Clause is emphatically not an effort to protect
traditionally held values against novel or short-term deviations.
The Clause could not be characterized as a "nondegradation prin-
ciple" designed to ensure that things will not "get worse." 5 It is
implausible to describe the role of the Supreme Court, under the
Equal Protection Clause, as the provision of a sober second
thought to legislation or the defense of tradition against pent-up
majorities. The clause is not backward-looking at all; it was self-
consciously designed to eliminate practices that existed at the time
of ratification and that were expected to endure.6
The function of the Equal Protection Clause is to protect dis-
advantaged groups, of which blacks are the most obvious case,
against the effects of past and present discrimination by political
majorities. The scope of the Clause and the precise content of the
equality norm are of course deeply disputed. 7 But on any view,
the Equal Protection Clause is not rooted in common law or status
quo baselines, or in Anglo-American conventions. The baseline is
instead a principle of equality that operates as a criticism of ex-
isting practice. The clause does not safeguard traditions; it protects
against traditions, however long-standing and deeply rooted.
This difference accounts for the fact that Supreme Court deci-
See generally Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (cited in note 10).
15 Easterbrook, 1982 S Ct Rev at 95 (cited in note 42).
66 See Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of
Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 Stan L Rev 5 (1949). Brown v Board of Education,
347 US 483 (1954) is the most obvious illustration of judicial endorsement of this point.
67 See Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 Phil & Pub Affairs
107, 108 (1976); Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90
Harv L Rev 1, 5 (1976).
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sions that reject common law or status quo baselines usually rely
on the Equal Protection Clause. 8 Cases involving the protection of
disadvantaged groups are, of course, the most conspicuous exam-
ples of this. 9 But it should be no surprise that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause has also been the source of decision in cases involving
such matters as voting rights,70 access to court,71 and disparities in
education.72
This approach also has implications for the privacy cases. In
particular, it suggests that there is much to be said in favor of the
mounting academic consensus73 that Roe v Wade involved issues of
sex discrimination as well as privacy, and that the problem of
abortion might plausibly have been approached in equal protection
terms. Laws that restrict reproductive rights burden women exclu-
sively; they are closely associated with traditional ideas about the
role of women in the raising of children, ideas that have played a
part in sex discrimination. The reason that it is both possible and
problematic to treat cases involving reproductive rights in terms of
due process is the same: the relevant tradition is highly ambiguous.
It may be that the Equal Protection Clause will ultimately prove
to be a preferable source of decision, though in order to defend the
outcome in Roe, the argument would have to be quite elaborate.7 4
However these more difficult questions may be resolved, there
is a large difference in the basic functions of the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses. The decision of the Court of Appeals in
Watkins therefore contains a lesson for doctrinal development
under the two clauses. The Due Process Clause may sometimes
11 See Sunstein, 87 Colum L Rev at 913 (cited in note 50).
61 See, for example, Graham v Richardson, 403 US 365 (1971) (aliens); Frontiero v
Richardson, 411 US 677 (1973) (women); Trimble v Gordon, 430 US 762 (1977) (nonmarital
children); Cleburne v Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 US 432 (1985) (mentally retarded).
71 See for example Harper v Virginia Board of Elections, 383 US 663 (1966); Kramer v
Union Free School District No. 15, 395 US 621 (1969).
71 See for example Griffin v Illinois, 351 US 12 (1956); Douglas v California, 372 US
353 (1963). See also the disagreement between Justices Douglas and Harlan on whether
litigation access fees raise problems of due process or equal protection in Boddie v Connect-
icut, 401 US 371 (1971).
11 See Plyer v Doe, 457 US 202 (1982).
73 See Tribe, American Constitutional Law at 1353-56 (cited in note 50); Catharine
MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified ch 8 (Harvard, 1987); Kenneth L. Karst, Foreword:
Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 Harv L Rev 1, 53-59 (1977);
Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S Cal L Rev 399, 431-32 n 83 (1985); Ruth Bader Gins-
burg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v Wade, 63 NC L Rev
375 (1985); David Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown (unpublished
manuscript on file with The University of Chicago Law Review).
7' See preceding note for preliminary efforts.
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permit traditions that the Equal Protection Clause proscribes,
even if those traditions are rooted in discrimination-a point that
both Eisenstadt and Watkins make clear.
This is hardly the space for a full-scale defense of the argu-
ment that classifications on the basis of sexual orientation should
be subject to heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause, an argument that has been made in detail in many places75
And there is reason for uncertainty about whether the current Su-
preme Court will accept that argument, especially in the context of
the military.70
It may be suggested, however, that the majority opinion in
Watkins correctly emphasized the history of discrimination against
gays and lesbians and the likelihood that challenged measures will
reflect past and present prejudice.77 Empathetic identification on
the part of the majority is peculiarly unusual in this setting. Stat-
utes and regulations that discriminate on the basis of sexual orien-
tation often reflect fear and hostility that are not susceptible to
rational justification.78 The rationale accepted in Hardwick as suf-
ficient for due process purposes-relating principally to tradition-
ally held moral norms-has little or no weight in the context of an
equal protection challenge; consider the Court's rejection of such
norms in the areas of race and sex discrimination. The Watkins
court also pointed to the peculiar difficulty of using political ave-
nues to seek redress e and the usual irrelevance of sexual orienta-
71 Watkins, 847 F2d at 1345-49. See also Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual
Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification, 98 Harv L Rev 1285, 1297 et seq
(1985); Note, An Argument for the Application of Equal Protection Heightened Scrutiny
to Classifications Based on Homosexuality, 57 S Cal L Rev 797 (1984); Bruce A. Ackerman,
Beyond Carolene Products, 98 Harv L Rev 713, 740-46 (1985); Tribe, American Constitu-
tional Law at 1616-17 (cited in note 50).
" Rostker v Goldberg, 453 US 57 (1981) (deferring to legislative decision not to register
women for the draft); Greer v Spock, 424 US 828 (1976) (allowing regulation of speech on
military bases).
7 847 F2d at 1345-49.
11 See Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 162-63 (cited in note 59) (discussing prejudice
against homosexuals).
79 847 F2d at 1348-49. The problem here stems in part from the fact that gays and
lesbians are subject to widespread social hostility. As a result, disclosure of homosexuality
creates a series of risks of social sanctions, ranging from various forms of social ostracism to
dismissal from employment to private violence. It is for this reason, among others, that the
exercise of political power by gays and lesbians is unusually difficult. See Ackerman, 98
Harv L Rev at 728-31 (cited in note 75); Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 162-64 (cited in
note 59).
Ordinary equal protection law, embodied in United States v Carolene Products Co.,
304 US 144 (1938), depends on crude understandings about political organization. Discrete-
ness and insularity may increase rather than decrease the capacity to exert political influ-
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tion to legitimate governmental goals.8 0 In these respects, the pat-
tern of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is
strikingly analogous to the pattern of discrimination against
blacks. Particularly notable is the Watkins court's treatment of
the relationship between immutability and equal protection
problems."'
The arguments used to justify exclusion of gays and lesbians
from the military are the same arguments that were once used to
allow discrimination on the basis of race and sex. Those justifica-
tions refer primarily to adverse effects on military morale and dis-
cipline, adverse effects that are a product of private biases.82 The
record in Watkins suggests that those arguments are no more per-
suasive here than there. The general argument for heightened scru-
tiny of classifications based on sexual orientation applies regardless
of the weight of the justifications in particular cases, and regard-
less of the possibility that the military presents special considera-
tions arguing in favor of judicial deference."
It may be useful to conclude by suggesting that the legal re-
gime produced by Watkins is coherent even in the face of Hard-
wick. Watkins makes it generally impermissible to single out gays
ence, and among the most important sources of real world political failure is the undue
influence of well organized private groups as against diffuse, poorly organized majorities. See
Geoffrey P. Miller, The True Story of Carolene Products, 1987 S Ct Rev 397, 404-06, 422-
28; Ackerman, 98 Harv L Rev at 734-37 (cited in note 75). The insights of modern public
choice theory thus bear significantly on the theory of equal protection.
It would be a large mistake, however, to use those insights in order to suggest that equal
protection problems can be approached solely through a non-normative understanding (as-
suming that such a thing could be imagined) of the problems of political organization in the
particular case. As the defining case of blacks reveals, the question whether a group deserves
special solicitude under the Equal Protection Clause depends on an inescapably normative
inquiry into the legitimacy of the reasons ordinarily used to disadvantage that group. Al-
though such an inquiry will ask whether political organization is feasible in the circum-
stances, it cannot be limited to that question.
80 847 F2d at 1346.
81 "Although the causes of homosexuality are not fully understood, scientific research
indicates that we have little control over our sexual orientation and that, once acquired, our
sexual orientation is largely impervious to change.[citations omitted]. Scientific proof aside,
it seems appropriate to ask whether heterosexuals feel capable of changing their sexual ori-
entation. Would heterosexuals living in a city that passed an ordinance banning those who
engaged in or desired to engage in sex with persons of the opposite sex find it easy not only
to abstain from heterosexual activity but also to shift the object of their sexual desires to
persons of the same sex?" 847 F2d at 1347-48 (emphases in original).
82 See Watkins, 847 F2d at 1350: "These concerns strike a familiar chord. For much of
our history, the military's fear of racial tension kept black soldiers separated from whites."
Note also that in the context of Watkins, the concern about blackmail was quite weak.
"[H]omosexuality poses a special risk of blackmail only if a homosexual is secretive about
his or her sexual orientation." Id at 1352.
83 See note 76 (cases reflecting judicial deference in matters concerning the military).
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and lesbians for special disabilities; differential treatment of that
sort will face a large burden of justification. So long as Hardwick
remains the law, however, measures that proscribe certain sexual
activities may be upheld against a due process attack so long as the
prohibitions apply regardless of sexual orientation . 4 The require-
ment of generality operates as a political safeguard, ensuring that
if the heterosexual majority is to burden gays and lesbians, it must
burden itself as well. In imposing this requirement of generality,
the Equal Protection Clause, as understood in Watkins, serves its
most familiar and established function.
III. CONCLUSION
The Watkins court's interpretation of Bowers v Hardwick was
correct. The court of appeals in Padula, and Judge Reinhardt in
his dissenting opinion in Watkins, misconstrued the Hardwick de-
cision. The conclusion that the Due Process Clause does not pro-
tect consensual homosexual sodomy does not resolve the question
whether principles of equal protection forbid discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation. 5
I" The qualification is necessary because Hardwick left open the possibility that hetero-
sexual sodomy is constitutionally protected. According to the view presented here, of course,
an equal protection attack would be available in those jurisdictions that banned homosexual
but not heterosexual sodomy. See note 26. But see Baker v Wade, 769 F2d 289 (5th Cir
1985) (en banc) (upholding such a statute). Watkins itself need not be understood to go that
far, however, since the decision applies to distinctions based on sexual orientation rather
than on the nature of sexual acts.
85 For purposes of the present discussion, I put to one side some of the other difficulties
with using Hardwick to dispose of claims of unconstitutional discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation. To list just a few:
(1) Sometimes a civil disability might be imposed on gays and lesbians in jurisdictions
in which there is no criminal prohibition on homosexual acts. In such a jurisdiction, Hard-
wick is of uncertain relevance. It is by no means clear that the fact that the state could
criminalize the relevant acts is sufficient to support discrimination in circumstances in
which the state has chosen to impose no such criminal disability.
(2) It is unclear that the state's power to criminalize homosexual acts includes the au-
thority to impose unique or distinctive civil disabilities on a class of people that includes
many who engage in such acts. Imagine, for example, a law prohibiting gays and lesbians
from teaching in the public schools. Even if homosexual acts may be criminalized, it remains
necessary to explain why a class including many who engage in such acts, and not other
criminal acts, are being forced to suffer civil sanctions. The problem becomes more severe in
light of the fact that the civil sanctions appear weakly related to legitimate state purposes.
(3) Discrimination against people of homosexual orientation is different from discrimi-
nation against people who engage in acts that are and can constitutionally be criminal-
ized-as the Watkins court emphasized. The difference is important in at least two ways.
First, members of the relevant class may not have engaged in the prohibited acts at all.
Second, discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation has some of the characteristics of a
status offense as prohibited in Robinson v California, 370 US 660 (1962).
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The conclusion of the Watkins court also contains a large and
often overlooked lesson about the relationship between the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses. The Due Process Clause is
backward-looking; a large part of its reach is defined by reference
to tradition. The clause is closely associated with, even if not lim-
ited to, the view that the role of the Court is to protect against ill-
considered or short-term departures from time-honored practices.
The Equal Protection Clause, by contrast, is grounded in a norm of
equality that operates largely as a critique of traditional practices.
The Watkins decision provides reason to believe that constitu-
tional protection against discrimination on the basis of sexual ori-
entation will ultimately take place under the Equal Protection
Clause. It should be unsurprising if such developments occur even
in the wake of Bowers v Hardwick.
A detailed assessment of arguments of this sort would, however, go far beyond the sub-
ject of this essay.
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